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The Federal Budget's Effects 
on Intergenerational Equity: 
Undone or Not Undone?* 
Gary H. Stern 
President 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
You are probably well aware of the view that we are 
impoverishing our young and future generations by our 
shortsighted budget policies. This allegedly is happening 
in at least one of two ways. One is the substitution of 
government consumption for private investment. The 
idea here is that when the government spends more for 
current services, such as for military personnel or 
welfare, this spending does not perfectly substitute for 
private consumption spending. Therefore, higher govern-
ment spending is not offset dollar-for-dollar by lower 
private consumption spending. Higher government 
spending thus leads to higher total consumption (public 
plus private), which crowds out investment. And lower 
investment means that future generations will have 
fewer goods available than they otherwise would. 
The other way the federal budget allegedly affects 
the welfare of the young and future generations is the 
shifting over time of the tax burden. Their welfare 
supposedly is reduced when the government lowers 
taxes and replaces the lost tax revenue with debt, what 
we know well as deficit financing. This forces our 
children and future generations to pay higher taxes in 
order to pay the interest on the debt. Thus, as long as the 
government leaves its spending plans unchanged, lower 
taxes today imply higher taxes in the future, so that 
future generations will foot the bill for today's govern-
ment expenditures. 
Those who listened carefully heard me say that the 
effects of federal budget policies I just described are 
alleged. In fact, the validity of these effects is being hotly 
debated among economists and public policymakers. 
Some don't think high government spending is leading 
to too little investment; and others don't think the 
burden of taxes is being shifted to future generations. 
How can that be? 
In my talk today, I want to try to answer that question 
by discussing the basic issues in these debates, but I 
want to concentrate mainly on those issues related to 
deficit financing and its implications for tax shifting. I 
choose to focus on the financing issue because I think 
that's the most relevant to current policy and that's 
where the debate is sharpest. I then want to assess the 
empirical support for the different views on tax shifting. 
Finally, I want to review the implications of these views 
for budget policy. As we'll see, how budget policy can 
affect the welfare of future generations is still a very 
open issue. And even if we accept a particular view 
about how budget policy affects intergenerational 
equity, we still need a leap of faith to prescribe how 
budget policy should be changed in order to improve it. 
Nevertheless, I take that leap, based primarily on my 
analysis of the evidence, and I suggest that the prudent 
policy is to put our budget deficits on a declining track. 
*Speech presented January 13, 1987, at the conference on Growth and 
Productivity in an Aging Society, sponsored by Americans for Generational 
Equity and held at the Hubert Humphrey Institute for Public Policy, University 
of Minnesota, Minneapolis. The author acknowledges Preston J. Miller and Neil 
Wallace for their contribution to this speech. A list of suggested readings is 
appended for those interested in further pursuing the ideas presented here. 
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On Crowding Out 
The issues behind the crowding-out effects of govern-
ment spending deal more with what is actually occur-
ring than what is theoretically possible. Clearly, U.S. 
government spending has increased over the last decade— 
from about 19 percent of the gross national product 
(GNP) in fiscal year 1974 to about 24 percent in fiscal 
1986. And there seems to be little dispute that govern-
ment consumption spending theoretically can drive out 
private investment spending and thus alter the evolution 
of the economy's capital stock. Some people, though, 
don't seem to think this has been happening, at least in a 
way to concern future generations. 
These people seem to have one of two arguments in 
mind. One is that we had been investing too much in the 
first place, so if the government has crowded out some 
investment, that's all to the good. Less investment will 
make us and future generations better off, they argue. 
This position is supported by some economic theories 
that say an inefficiency of too much saving and 
investment can occur in an economy. Because of the 
inefficiency, it would be possible to reduce the amount 
being saved and invested and still increase the amount 
being consumed by each generation. According to these 
theories, a symptom of this inefficiency is that the real 
return on capital is low relative to the economy's real 
growth rate. Those who make this argument thus point 
to the very low market interest rates adjusted for 
inflation (measures of the real rate of return on capital) 
that the U.S. economy experienced between 1948 and 
1982 as evidence that there had been too much 
investment. 
A second argument made by those unconcerned 
about crowding out is that the increased government 
spending has been not so much for consumption as for 
investment purposes. All we are witnessing, they say, is 
the substitution of government investment for private 
investment. If what they say is true, then there are no 
obvious effects on the welfare of future generations. 
It is in fact difficult to determine the extent to which 
increased government spending has been for consump-
tion as opposed to investment. Do defense expenditures 
added today, for instance, just protect current genera-
tions, or do they also ensure that our country will remain 
free for future generations? And do additional welfare 
payments made today just benefit the current recipients, 
or do some payments, such as WIC (Women, Infants, 
and Children) and school meal programs, also lead to 
healthier, more productive members of society who will 
benefit our economy in the future? 
To sum up, the issues behind the debate about 
increased government spending are tough, but an 
awareness of them should make us a bit cautious about 
policy proposals to cut government consumption and 
spur private investment. These proposals may be wise, 
but it is not a foregone conclusion that they are. 
On Shifting the Tax Burden 
I now want to leave the crowding-out debate and turn to 
my main topic: shifting the tax burden to future 
generations. The debate about tax shifting centers on 
whether the alternative tax and debt combinations that 
a government can use to finance a given stream of 
expenditures matter for intergenerational equity. This 
issue seems particularly relevant today: When the 
federal deficit rose from roughly 2 percent of GNP 
before 1982 to 5 percent after, almost the whole 
increase was due to the Reagan administration's tax cut, 
which caused the direct loss of tax revenue and the rise 
in interest payments on the resulting federal debt. The 
issue, then, is whether this change in budget policies, if 
we consider it a permanent change, will adversely affect 
the welfare of future generations. 
Economists who debate this issue generally have the 
same realistic world in mind: The population is assumed 
to be composed of overlapping generations; each 
individual lives for a finite time; and at each time, new 
individuals are born. These economists disagree, how-
ever, on a particular point: how current generations are 
assumed to provide privately for future generations. 
Two Views: YOYO and COOL 
There are two main views on how private provisions are 
made for future generations. According to one, parents 
provide for their children when they are young and 
living at home, but do not provide for them when they 
get older and leave home. I'll call this the you're-on-
your-own view. The parents' reasons for not making 
bequests to their children could be several: 
• The parents' current welfare may not depend on 
their children's future welfare (they just don't care). 
• The parents may care about their children's future 
welfare, but think the children will be morally 
better off providing for themselves. 
• The parents may care, but expect their children to 
be wealthy enough in the future to make bequests 
unnecessary. 
The other view, as you may have guessed, is just the 
opposite: parents provide for their children both when 
3 they are young and living at home and when they get 
older and leave home. The parents make bequests to 
their children, because making the children better off in 
the future increases the parents' welfare today. For 
better or worse, I'll call this the count-on-our-loot view. 
These two views give sharply different answers to 
the question, Are the Reagan tax cut and resulting 
deficits impoverishing future generations? The you're -
on-your-own view of the world says yes. According to 
it, people spend the proceeds of the tax cut rather than 
putting them aside for future generations. Thus, a cut in 
taxes with no change in monetary policy increases the 
supply of government debt without an offsetting in-
crease in private savings. This results in a higher real 
interest rate; higher inflation; and a current-account 
deficit, as foreigners are enticed to buy some of our 
debt. Future generations are made worse off by this tax 
policy because they are forced to pay the interest on the 
debt either through higher explicit taxes, such as the 
income tax, or through higher implicit taxes, such as the 
inflation tax. In contrast, the count-on-our-loot view 
says no. According to it, the time profile of taxes and, 
hence, deficits is irrelevant to intergenerational equity. 
By putting aside savings for future generations, the 
private sector will simply undo changes in the govern-
ment's budget financing policy. In order to understand 
this potential to undo a policy change, let's consider two 
examples. 
• Example of Undoing: I 
First, consider a simple example closer to home. Have 
you ever had cement curbs put in your neighborhood 
and then been charged with a special assessment? Your 
city government will typically provide you with two 
payment alternatives: 
• You can pay in total up front. 
• You can pay in equal annual installments 
over a number of years. 
If you choose the first option, you may have to borrow 
from your local bank and pay off the bank loan over a 
number of years. In this case the city pays the curb 
construction firm, and the city incurs no debt. If instead 
you choose to pay off the assessment over a number of 
years, the city must borrow to pay off the construction 
firm and then bill you for the payments it must make on 
the debt. In this case the city runs a deficit and must 
borrow. 
If, however, the rate at which the city borrows is no 
different from the rate at which you borrow from your 
bank, these two payment alternatives are equivalent. 
For the first alternative, you borrow directly to pay the 
city, which pays the construction firm, and then you 
must repay your debt. For the second, the city borrows 
and pays the construction firm, but then you must pay 
the city's debt. For either alternative, the firm gets paid 
up front and you make precisely the same payments. 
The only difference is whether you're paying off your 
loan or the city's. For this example, you undo the city 
government's borrowing in the market by an offsetting 
change in your borrowing at a bank. 
It seems crucial in this example that the length of the 
government debt is less than your lifetime, because then 
for any alternative, you're the one who bears the costs. 
Now let's consider a second, broader example—that of 
federal debt, which essentially has indefinite maturity. 
• Example of Undoing: II 
Let's suppose the federal government gives you the 
option of paying for expenditures on a tax-as-you-go 
basis or paying each year only the annual cost of 
servicing debt issued to finance the expenditures. If you 
have a you're-on-your-own view (and I realize that the 
acronym for this view is YOYO) about future genera-
tions, you will choose the second option, because it lets 
you push some of the costs of the expenditures onto 
them through debt servicing. 
But if you have a count-on-our-loot (I apologize, but 
COOL) view, your attitude toward the two payment 
options will be different. If you want to help out your 
heirs as well as yourself, you might still choose the 
second option but undo its negative effects on their 
welfare. You might say that by choosing to pay only the 
annual debt service, you are saving yourself $X relative 
to the tax-as-you-go option. So you'll take that saving 
of $X, invest it, and bequeath the whole investment to 
your heirs. By saving and bequeathing the reduction in 
your taxes, you undo the effects that your lower taxes 
would have had on future generations. They will still be 
faced with higher taxes, but the extra money you 
bequeath them will exactly cover their higher tax 
payments. 
The principle that comes out of this example is that 
when each generation considers not only its own 
welfare but also the welfare of future generations, it will 
undo the effects of the lower taxes on intergenerational 
welfare by saving more and bequeathing the proceeds 
to future generations. The bequests link the generations 
into infinitely lived families so that the lifetime of a 
family is at least as great as that of any government debt 
instrument. 
To summarize, if current generations don't want to 
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help out future generations, then a cut in taxes today 
will shift some of the tax burden for current government 
expenditures to future generations. But if current genera-
tions do want to help out future generations, they will 
increase their savings, bequeath the savings to their 
heirs, and so undo a tax cut's intergenerational equity 
effects. 
Some Evidence Favoring YOYO 
Which of these views, YOYO or COOL, seems most 
consistent with the data? The evidence is not decisive, 
but I think it leans in the YOYO direction. 
Admittedly, most formal economic literature tends 
to side with the count-on-our-loot view. Studies usually 
find that consumption does not depend on taxes, so that 
a tax cut would simply lead to more private savings. 
There are studies, however, which dispute that finding. 
In fact, the December 1986 issue of the American 
Economic Review has a series of articles which debate 
this question with no clear winner. 
The economic literature on this debate, however, is 
suspect. It does not distinguish between temporary and 
permanent tax cuts and generally does not include 
observations past 1982. In our examples we saw that 
the different tax shifting effects would only show up 
with permanent policy changes. For even with the 
you're-on-your-own view of the world, a government 
debt with a shorter maturity than the lives of individuals— 
which would be the case with temporary tax cuts or 
deficits—could be undone by the actions of private 
individuals. 
The real test of these views, then, comes with the 
Reagan tax cut of 1982, which we might consider 
permanent. According to the count-on-our-loot view, 
after the tax cut occurred, we should have seen an 
upsurge in private saving to undo the government 
dissaving without an increase in real interest rates or a 
large increase in foreign funds coming into the United 
States. Instead, of course, we saw no increase in savings, 
a sharp increase in real interest rates, and large inflows 
of foreign funds. In fact, what happened was that 
private savings did not grow to offset the increase in 
government dissaving, the increase in total debt caused 
real interest rates to rise, and the debt was financed to a 
large extent by foreign funds—the flip side of which is 
our large trade deficit. These happenings are all 
consistent with the you're-on-your-own view. 
An Analysis: The YOYOs Dominate 
If you buy my judgment that the you're-on-your-own 
view is the most correct interpretation of the current 
situation, where does that leave us? First, we face a 
puzzle. By meeting here to discuss the effects of 
government policies on the future, we have evidence 
that people do care about the welfare of future genera-
tions. So why do the data suggest that you are not 
investing your savings from lower taxes and bequeath-
ing the proceeds to your children? I can only speculate 
about a possible reason: Some of you are doing those 
things, but a significant number in our economy aren't. 
My reasoning is that our economy includes both 
types of individuals: the you're-on-your-own crowd 
and the count-on-our-loot crowd. But the qualitative 
effects of a tax cut on the economy are determined by 
the you're-on-your-own group. When a tax cut occurs, 
this crowd is made wealthier and consumes more. In 
contrast, the count-on-our-loot crowd tries to undo the 
tax cut's effects on their heirs, but the actions of the 
you're-on-your-own crowd frustrates their efforts. If 
count-on-our-loot people simply invest their tax sav-
ings and make bequests of the proceeds, their consump-
tion will be left unchanged, but total consumption will 
increase as the you're-on-your-own crowd increases its 
consumption. Thus, total investment will decline. Al-
though the count-on-our-loot crowd's actions will 
offset their children's future debt-servicing costs, their 
actions will not offset the income loss their children will 
suffer due to the reduction in investment. 
To summarize: The effects of a permanent tax cut 
and the resulting deficit financing are qualitatively 
what we expect from the you're-on-your-own view. 
This is because the effects we observe are essentially 
the sum of the neutral effects of the COOLs and the 
nonneutral effects of the YOYOs. The nonneutral 
effects dominate. Such a policy change thus benefits 
people who do not make bequests to their children, 
because they gain income which they do not turn over 
to their heirs. Such a policy change harms people who 
do make bequests, however, because even if they turn 
over all their tax savings to their children, it won't be 
enough to maintain their children's future welfare. 
A Cautious Recommendation 
This analysis leads me to cautiously recommend the 
adoption of budget policies to gradually reduce the 
federal deficit. Caution is required for at least two 
reasons. First, frankly I'm not sure I have the right 
solution to the puzzle of why the effects of current 
budget deficits are not being undone. A different 
solution may well lead to a different recommendation. 
But even if my solution is correct, my recommendation 
is not right or wrong. A reduction in deficits would lead 
5 to winners (the COOL crowd) and losers (the YOYO 
crowd). We should remember that any recommenda-
tion about such policies involves a value judgment. 
Nevertheless, I must say that I do favor some 
reduction in the federal deficit. This is primarily 
because my view of the YOYO crowd's dominance 
suggests that the change would help solve some current 
economic problems. For a given monetary policy, my 
view suggests that a reduction in the deficit would lead 
to a decline in the total supply of debt and hence to a 
lower real interest rate. A lower real rate would help 
many private borrowers currently in financial distress. 
Also, the decline in debt would let us rely less on foreign 
financing, which would lower the trade deficit. This in 
turn could lower pressure to erect costly trade barriers. 
Finally, I must admit, I favor a reduction in the federal 
deficit for a more personal reason: This may surprise 
you, but I am not a YOYO. 
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